Will CETA Help Tories… Or Hurt Them??
With Prime Minister Harper making the diplomatic rounds in Europe, media interest has heightened this week regarding the potential free trade agreement which his government is trying to negotiate with the European Union. Several deadlines to reach that deal have come and gone, but the Conservatives are still heavily committed to reaching a deal as a centrepiece of their economic strategy. The more politically desperate they become to reach a deal, the greater the likelihood of damaging concessions (in areas like foreign takeovers, drug patents, and others).
The Globe and Mailâ€™s John Ibbitson went so far as to conclude that failure to reach an EU deal would actually cost the Conservatives the next election (â€œHarperâ€™s re-election chances may hinge on trade deal with Europe,â€ June 10). If that surprising statement is true, itâ€™s only because of the hype that has been created around CETA â€“ and certainly not because of its real-world economic effects. If enough politicians and journalists state gravely that reaching a CETA is crucial to our economic future, then perhaps enough Canadian voters could be convinced and vote accordingly.
But in reality, there is no conceivable way that a CETA, even under the most optimistic of assumptions, could generate any measurable improvement in Canadiansâ€™ concrete economic well-being before the next election. More likely, of course, the economic effects of CETA for Canadians will be negative (see my study Out of Equilibrium published by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, for a detailed review of the economic risks of the proposed deal). But even under the governmentâ€™s own optimistic projections, the economic impacts would be impossible to measure before Canadians next head to the ballot box.
According to a joint Canada-EU study published in 2008, a bilateral trade deal would provide a one-time boost to Canadaâ€™s GDP of about $12 billion, or about two-thirds of one percentage point. (I have criticized that estimate in other work.) That increment would be experienced gradually over a multi-year period (since it requires several years for the deal itself to be phased in, and several more for its effects to be fully felt in the economy). In economic modeling of trade deals, analysts typically assume it takes at least a decade for the effects of a change in trade policy to be fully incorporated into investment, production, employment, and trade outcomes. So even under the rose-coloured assumptions utilized by the government study, therefore (including continuous full employment, no impact from exchange rate adjustments, and no outflows of capital investment), the economic effects of CETA would be impossible to measure, let alone become a significant factor in an election campaign.
Without those unrealistic assumptions, moreover, the effects of CETA are likely to be negative. My simulations for the CCPA predicted a loss in Canadian employment (mostly in the manufacturing sector) of up to 150,000 jobs. We learned in the aftermath of the Canada-U.S. free trade deal in 1989 that the downside of trade (plant closures) is experienced a lot more quickly than the potential upside (incremental export opportunities for the companies that remain). In that case, implementing a CETA (if the resulting job losses are indeed significant) would do more harm than good to the Conservativesâ€™ re-election chances â€“ the exact opposite of Mr. Ibbitsonâ€™s judgment. (Despite that, I am still hoping that no deal is reached!)
In response to media inquiries this week regarding the likely effects of a CETA on Canadaâ€™s auto industry and other key sectors, I dug out the most recent data on bilateral trade flows between Canada and the EU. They confirm my earlier suspicion that a CETA will make our existing lopsided trade relationship with Europe even worse â€“ both quantitatively and qualitatively. And there are a few surprises lurking in the latest numbers, too.
Here are my findings; most of the data come from Industry Canadaâ€™s helpful Strategis on-line database, while data on services trade come from Statistics Canada (CANSIM Table 376-0036). In addition, the last half of this commentary goes into more detail on the impact of the proposed CETA on the Canadian auto industry:
Continuing Bilateral Trade Deficit: Canada imports far more from Europe than we export there, producing a large and chronic trade deficit. Eliminating tariffs and liberalizing trade on both sides will make that deficit bigger, not smaller, for two reasons: European sellers already have a larger platform in our market (from which they can expand their sales more successfully after tariffs are eliminated), and Canada will actually be cutting tariffs more than the Europeans (since our tariffs, on a trade-weighted average basis, are about half-again as high as the EUâ€™s tariffs). Our total merchandise trade deficit in 2012 was just under $12 billion. Thatâ€™s somewhat smaller than in previous years, but for a surprising reason: gold exports (discussed further below).
Trade Deficit in Services, Too: The quantitative imbalance in bilateral trade extends to services, too â€“ like transportation, business services, and tourism. Canadaâ€™s bilateral services deficit with the EU in 2010 (most recent year available) was $4.5 billion, the biggest ever. The impact of the over-valued Canadian dollar on our relative costs is clearly a factor here, as is the continuing economic turmoil in Europe (which has cut deeply into outbound EU tourism). Combining goods and services, therefore, our bilateral trade represents a drain on net demand in Canada of over $15 billion per year. Our overall current account position with the EU is even worse (once we include net outflows of investment income). The EU thus likely accounts for about one-third of Canadaâ€™s growing current account deficit (which reached a record $62 billion last year). Especially during times of unemployment, trade deficits represent a direct drain on domestic employment and income (contrary to the assumptions of free-market trade models â€¦ which assume, donâ€™t forget, that unemployment never exists!).
Qualitative Imbalance in the Composition of Trade: In 2012, manufactured goods accounted for 94 percent of all EU sales to Canada. And as we know, European exporters specialize in higher-technology, more expensive niches in manufacturing. In contrast, manufactures account for only 50 percent of Canadaâ€™s exports to Europe. Our exports are thus far more concentrated in natural resource and agricultural industries. This is a problem for several reasons. First, EU tariffs on imported raw materials (other than agricultural products) tend to be very low (for obvious reasons), so there will be little benefit to our resource industries from a trade deal. Second, our trade balance will be very sensitive to fluctuations in commodity prices. When prices come down (and where commodities are concerned, this is inevitable), then our existing deficit with Europe will become much larger.
Lopsided Manufacturing Trade: Canada imported $47.4 billion worth of manufactures from the EU in 2012, but only exported $19.7 billion worth. The resulting bilateral trade deficit in manufactures (of almost $28 billion) was the highest in our history. And that imbalance is getting worse, not better. In the last five years (since 2007, through the financial crisis and resulting recession and stagnation), our manufactured exports to the EU declined by 21 percent â€“ while our manufactured imports from Europe grew by over 10 percent. Thatâ€™s not surprising, given terrible demand conditions within Europe, the sharp depreciation of the euro relative to our loonie, and the growing efforts by European countries to export their way out of recession. A free trade agreement wonâ€™t fix that imbalance, and more likely will exacerbate it. Canadaâ€™s status as an exporter of resources, which (even during times of high commodity prices) are not quite enough to pay for our imports of high-value manufactures, will be cemented. A good chunk of our manufacturing exports to Europe are themselves resource-based products (things like petroleum products, primary nickel, wood products, etc.). To be fair, there are also some important higher-value manufactures represented among our slate of exports to Europe, including aerospace ($2.5 billion exported in 2012), chemicals ($2.8 billion), and machinery ($2.3 billion). Those are exceptions, however, to the general pattern that defines our bilateral trade: namely, Canada sells resources, and buys back high-tech manufactures. And even in those three sectors, Canada imports more from Europe than we export there.
The Curious Role of Canadaâ€™s Gold Exports to the EU: According to the trade data, Canadaâ€™s largest export to the EU, far and away, is now gold. The Industry Canada data indicate that Canada exported $11.7 billion worth of gold to the EU in 2012 (accounting for almost 80% of our total gold exports). We import very little gold back the other way. Much of that exported gold, it appears, was actually imported from elsewhere, perhaps processed in some way in Canada, and then re-exported to Europe. (While Canadian-based companies dominate the list of the worldâ€™s largest gold-miners, Canada itself is only the 7th largest gold producer in the world; most of the Canadian firmsâ€™ major operations are in other countries. In aggregate, Canada imports a lot of gold as well as exporting it, further indicating some kind of trans-shipment trade pattern.) Our gold exports to the EU have exploded by a factor of 100 over the last decade (partly, of course, because of the soaring price of gold, but mostly because of the opening up of a brand new trade channel). This statistic raises some interesting questions. If the price of gold falls (as it surely will), then our trade imbalance with the EU will expand dramatically. And this explosion of gold exports to Europe has masked the underlying structural deterioration in our overall trade with Europe. Indeed, considering all merchandise other than gold, Canadaâ€™s trade deficit with the EU last year was $23 billion â€“ the highest in history. So Canada is relying on a temporary surge in value of gold shipments to Europe (much of which was not even produced here) to offset a growing structural imbalance in our other bilateral trade. I would be interested in learning more about the nature of and reasons for Canadaâ€™s surging gold exports to Europe, and invite readers to contact me with ideas. (The question of gold exports to Europe was also explored by John Jacobs in another CCPA report, Straightjacket: CETAâ€™s Constraining Effects on Ontario).
Automotive Trade â€“ A One-Way Street: Bilateral EU-Canada trade in automotive products epitomizes, to the extreme, the quantitative and qualitative imbalance of our overall trade relationships with Europe. Canada imported $5.6 billion worth of automotive products (vehicles, parts, and bodies) from the EU in 2012. European companies (especially luxury brands like BMW, Mercedes, and Audi) have significantly expanded their market share in Canada in recent years (some of their products are imported from plants in the U.S.; the $5.6 billion figure applies only to products made in Europe). In return, Canada shipped just $269 million the other way. We import 20 times as much as we export. The resulting bilateral automotive deficit ($5.3 billion) was the worst in history. Canadian automotive exports to Europe have fallen by half in the last five years (reflecting, again, the negative impact of depressed market conditions in Europe and our overvalued currency), while our automotive imports from Europe have steadily grown. During the first four months of 2013, Canadaâ€™s auto exports to Europe fell by another 15 percent (year over year). Our bilateral auto deficit with Europe is now almost as bad as with Japan (which used to be our most unbalanced auto trade partner).
Given this highly unbalanced starting point in bilateral automotive trade, there is no way that bilateral liberalization could produce anything other than a widening of this initial existing deficit. Canada would eliminate its 6.1% automotive tariff (over some unknown timetable), and the EU would do the same with its 10% tariff. The resulting increase in trade flows in both directions will be driven both by the proportional reduction in costs and by the size of the initial starting point. (Arithmetically, economic models calculate the change in trade each way as the product of the decline in tariffs, an assumed elasticity of demand, and the size of the starting trade flow.) Since the initial flow of automotive imports from Europe is so much larger, the resulting increment in additional imports will inevitably dwarf even a large proportional expansion of Canadaâ€™s (very small) automotive exports to Europe. (And that assumes that market conditions in Europe recover, reversing the current trend of declining automotive purchases from abroad.) The federal governmentâ€™s own joint study confirms this finding: that study anticipates that the bilateral deficit ($5.3 billion in 2012) would grow by another $600 million under a CETA. In reality, the damage would likely be greater. Under no circumstances can the auto industry be seen as a â€œwinnerâ€ from a deal that liberalizes trade with a larger, more globally-oriented competitor.
Another interesting feature of the auto negotiations at CETA has been the issue of rules of origin. To qualify for tariff-free treatment under a trade deal, a product must embody sufficient content produced in the originating FTA-partner country. (This prevents a country from importing a product from a third party, and then re-exporting it tariff-free to its FTA partner.) This creates a fundamental asymmetry in the Canada-EU case, by virtue of the different sizes of the two parties. Europe is a continent; the auto industry there utilizes a supply chain that includes parts and supplies produced in many different EU countries (even if most of the complete vehicles imported to Canada receive their final assembly in Germany). For Canada, the supply chain is similarly continental â€“ but under a CETA, this would make it very difficult for Canadian-made vehicles to pass an equivalent rule of origin threshold. The apparent solution to this problem (as reported in media stories based on unofficial draft texts) seems to be to allow Canada to export up to a certain quota of vehicles, tariff-free, without meeting the same rule of origin requirement that will be imposed on European-made products. This ad-hoc exemption would disappear if and when the U.S. also signs a trade deal with the EU. While novel, this feature of the CETA will have no meaningful impact on the continuing bilateral trade pattern, which will continue to be dominated by Canadaâ€™s large (and growing) vehicle imports from Europe. Indeed, leaked EU memos describing this feature explicitly noted it was motivated purely by the political requirement that the automotive aspect of the deal must be seen to be even-handed.
International vehicle manufacturers are generally supportive of the CETA (as well as the proposed U.S.-EU deal), not surprisingly since most have operations on both sides of the Atlantic and will profit from the additional flexibility it would grant them in production and marketing strategies. From the perspective of Canadian automotive production, however, it is impossible to imagine a CETA doing anything other than incrementally undermining the overall demand for our products (since the loss of sales to new imports will not nearly be offset by potential new exports). In other words, whatâ€™s good for the companies (as judged by their global executives) will not be good for the country. The same fundamental reality is true of proposed trade deals with Japan and Korea (either of which could potentially be folded into a bigger Trans-Pacific deal). In all of these discussions, the auto industry has become a bargaining chip to be played off, in hopes of winning concessions in other industries where Canada has more realistic offensive hopes. â€œCars for beef,â€ in essence, is the trade our government is trying to make â€“ and hence the auto industry will be a collateral victim of any of the deals currently on the table.
Imagining an Alternative: The problem here is not trade. The problem is free trade, following the NAFTA recipe (according to which no performance requirements or other safeguard measures are imposed to ensure that trade remains balanced and mutually beneficial). I could imagine a trade initiative with the EU that promoted an expansion of bilateral trade, but in a fair and balanced manner. Targets could be set for limiting the size of the bilateral imbalance in this strategic sector, for instance. Or European car manufacturers (like Volkswagen/Audi) could be required to invest in Canadian manufacturing operations (either directly, or indirectly through their purchases of parts) as a condition of tariff-free access to our consumers. Other countries do this sort of thing all the time. India, for example, is also negotiating an FTA with the EU â€“ but has already made it clear that tariffs (currently as high as 60 percent) will stay in place on vehicle imports to India (instead of exposing the infant domestic Indian industry to the full power of the European car industry). Brazil has many trade agreements, but still imposes requirements on companies to maintain proportional domestic operations in Brazil. Many jurisdictions (including Germany and France) use public equity (in various forms) as a way of enforcing loyalty from automakers. Japan and Korea benefit further from the structural strength of their domestic automakers in their home market, and a spate of direct and indirect subsidies for outbound exports. These are all tools that could be invoked in Canada, too, to promote more balanced auto trade with Europe and other jurisdictions. (The CAW proposed many measures like these in our 2012 auto policy paper, Rethinking the Auto Industry.)
However, they all run counter to the boy-scout adherence to pure free trade which still seems to guide our negotiators. And so for that reason, Canadian negotiators wonâ€™t even ask for these things â€¦ let alone bring them home in a tentative deal.
Re; PM Harper; YOU HAVE BEEN SERVED with;
“NOTIFICATION of Pre-Existing CHALLENGE(s)…”
Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Leader, Conservative Party,
Mr. DAN HILTON, Executive Director CP,
& Mr. Edward Fast, Minister for International Trade & Minister for Asian-Pacific Gateway;
I do not mean to rude, but, please do NOT thank me for any interest that I may, or, may NOT have regarding the existing, un ratified Canada – China Investment Treaty C-CIT; FIPA)
& the Canada – EU Comprehensive Economic & Trade Agreement (CETA);
I am just doing my due diligence research which will enable me, et al, to ascertain whether to support, improve, or, reject the Treaty, &/or, Agreement.
However, as a consequence of your not answering the simplest & most basic questions regarding:
1) the basis for The Compensation that is embodied in The W.A.D. Accord (a.k.a.; The Australian Question)
the lack of certainty regarding the proportions that corporates: Canada, China & European Union will pay for total amount of The Compensation that is embodied in The W.A.D. Accord as a consequence of the C.-C.I. Treaty & the Canada – EU C.E.T. Agreement
2) the lack of certainty regarding corporates: Canada, China & European Union agreements to pay for total amount of the costs of the punitive penalties, damages, costs, administrative, legal fees, etc. that may arise as a consequences of:
A) the CHALLENGES to the C.-C.I. Treaty & the Canada – EU C.E.T. Agreement,
B) the costs of the on-going research & dissemination of the information regarding the C.-C.I. Treaty & the Canada – EU C.E.T. Agreement to all of the parties that have expressed an interest in the development of the natural resources that have been found, & are continuing to be found, in Canada & thereby, render the non shareholders, et al, of the enterprises that can be derived from the aforementioned Treaty, &/or, Agreement, harmless
& thereby, prevent any abuses of the aforementioned costs, such as, using to the costs of The Challenges to increase the “profits” of the shareholders & the relevant corporations,
please be advised that;
YOU HAVE BEEN SERVED with:
“NOTIFICATION of Pre-Existing CHALLENGE to the CANADA â€“ CHINA
“NOTIFICATION of Pre-Existing CHALLENGE to the CANADA – EUROPEAN UNION
COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC & TRADE AGREEMENT”.
Is corporate Canada’s funding pool, & those of corporate China & corporate European Union, adequate to pay the aforementioned innocent, &/or, harmless taxpaying voters’, et al, for any, &, all, of the aforementioned costs of
1) “Preexisting Challenges” to the Canada – China Investment Treaty C-CIT)
& the Canada – EU Comprehensive Economic & Trade Agreement (CETA)
& the “After the Fact Challenges” if The Treaty, &/or, The Agreement are implemented/ratified?
Do you also understand that by not answering the aforementioned simple & most basic questions it will be an admission of guilt and will enhance the punitive damages awarded to non shareholders if, &/or, when the aforementioned Treaty, &/or, the Agreement have been ratified?
Would you please acknowledge that you have received the aforementioned C-CIT & CETA notifications?
Do you, Misters Harper, Hilton & Fast acknowledge that you have received the enclosed C-CIT & CETA notifications & the relevant references* in order to access the less comprehensive version of The W.A.D. Accord, including The Compensation?
David E.H. Smith
– “Qui tam…”.
P.S. – Did you not get my emails regarding the aforementioned “NOTIFICATIONs”, or, is there something wrong with your email addresses? Do you suggest that we correspond by registered mail?
For those who may not be familiar with The WAD Accord, &/or, its recent developments, The Accord can be accessed on line by way of the submission entitled:
“Towards a More Informed Opinion regarding the Environmental Impact & Context of the NGP (Pipeline), et al”, Researched & Submitted by D.E.H.S., July 24, 2012 to the Enbridge Co.’s NGP Joint Review Panel..
Ms. Colette Spagnuolo,
Process Advisor, Northern Gateway Project
(22nd Floor, 160 Elgin St. Ottawa ON K1A 0H3)
http://gatewaypanel.review-examen.gc/cl … r-eng.html
Public Registry; File â€ª#A43076â€¬
All letters of comment are under “F”. This comment is available
under the subfolder “S”.
EU may consider “Renditioning Info” as Condition of CETA Deal to Minimize “Unethical & Inhumane” Arrangements between Canadian lobbyists’ clients/parties’ executives; CHINA Unprotected with C-CITreaty?
President Jose Barroso (EU Commission), President Herman Van Rompuy (EUCouncil), President Schulz (EU Parliament), citizens of the European Union, et al;
Thank you for acknowledging the European Union’s Commission’s receipt of:
“The NOTIFICATION of Preexisting CHALLENGE to the Canada – EU Comprehensive Economic & Trade Agreement (CETA)”, #00000001.
I look forward to:
1) your answers to the enclosed, simple & basic questions and the answers to any of our future questions
2) sharing with you, et al, more of the relevant information that you may have been deprived of.
And, as the sharing of the information regarding the basis for the aforementioned “NOTIFICATION of Preexisting CHALLENGE to the Canada – EU CETAgreement”, is essential in preventing any divisiveness in the EU (ie. any desires to make separate, &/or, private arrangements), &/or, by other interested parties, would you please confirm that you have disseminated the provided information to all of the EU members? I’ll contact some of the members to see who you may have left out.
Yes; the government of Canada, corporate Canada, et al, would prefer that you, your members & corporate EU & its shareholders, et al, not ask too many questions about:
1) who & when some of the other participants, such as the Chinese, et al, have received the information regarding;
a) their “NOTIFICATION of the Re Existing CHALLENGE”, &/or, The COMPENSATION that is embodied in The W.A.D. Accord, et al,
b) the other participants’ suggested improvements to the CETA, &/or, Canada â€“ China Investment Treaty
their sharing of the information which can help exculpate the potential shareholders from their having to contribute a disproportionate amount for The Compensation &, perhaps, reduce the amounts that most EU taxpayers may have to pay for the CETA’s punitive penalties, etc.,
2) the process & mechanisms whereby the participants of the CETAgreement, &/or, the C-CITreaty can find remedies & compensations as a consequence of the aforementioned information deprivation
3) et al.
Presidents Barroso, Van Rompoy & Schulz, if there is anything else I can do to:
1) improve the clarity, the certainty, etc. of The Agreement, such as; providing more of the due diligence information that you have previously been deprived of, & thereby, further assist you to attain a greater understanding of some of the other problems, such as; the support, &/or, the lack of support for The Agreement by the various other Canadian interest groups & sovereignty/separatists/self governance groups, et al, that you may not have been encouraged to learn about by some Canadian interest groups, that will likely have detrimental effects upon:
a) the shareholders’ & the non shareholders’ value in regard to the projects that will be generated by The Agreement & their financing, particularly in regard to the disproportionate amount of co-manufacturing (ie. Canadian-European Union) projects that will be based in Canada
2) enhance the benefits to all of the participants who have expressed an interest in benefiting from the development of the natural resources that have been found, & are continuing to be found, in Canada,
3) et al.
I suggest that you consider reviewing & sharing more of the relevant, on line information by accessing:
1) Facebook; David Smith, Sidney, British Columbia,
2) Enbridge Co. regarding the submission entitled:
“Towards a More Informed Opinion regarding the Environmental Impact & Context of the NGP (Pipeline), et al”, Researched & Submitted by D.E.H.S., July 24, 2012 to the Enbridge Co.’s NGP Joint Review Panel.
Ms. Colette Spagnuolo,
Process Advisor, Northern Gateway Project
(22nd Floor, 160 Elgin St. Ottawa ON K1A 0H3)
http://gatewaypanel.review-examen.gc/cl … r-eng.html
Public Registry; File â€ª#A43076â€¬
All letters of comment are under “F”. This comment is available
under the subfolder “S”.
President Jose Barroso (EU Commission)& President Martin Schulz (EU Parliament) you can continue to contact me at my enclosed email address, or, by regular
2173 Bradford Ave.,
Sidney, British Columbia, CANADA. V2L 2C8.
Furthermore, by your organizations members, both; shareholders & non shareholders, insisting that Prime Minister Stephen Harper & his party’s liaison with the lobbying interests of corporate Canada (ie. the primary, direct beneficiary of the CETAgreement with the EU & the C-CITreaty with China), et al,
Mr. DAN HILTON:
1) acknowledge their receipts of the aforementioned “NOTIFICATIONS of Pre Existing CHALLENGES” for the consideration of the potential European shareholders, non shareholders, et al, in the projects that can be generated by the CETAgreement, it would enable, among other things, all of the potential participants to compare the relevant improvements to the CETAgreement with those of the other participants & thereby:
1) minimize, &/or, eliminate the divisive nature of the information deprivation within the European Union, et al
2) enhance, &/or, maximize the benefits (ie. the direct cash dividends & other) to, both; the shareholders & the non shareholders in Europe, China & Canada, particularly in the area of co manufactured products.
However, there are still many potential investors of the aforementioned CETAgreement projects, both; European & Canadian, who are not sure that they agree with those members, &/or, participants in the proposed CETAgreement, who have suggested that corporate Canada & its shareholders may have set aside more than adequate funds to pay for the necessary development of the aforementioned projects in order to maximize the shared (Canada – EU) net profits after paying the total costs of, for instance, designing & operating the CETAgreement’s dispute mechanisms & non public tribunals
the costs of:
1) corporate Canada defending the CETA CHALLENGES made by:
a) the EU’s members & its shareholders
b) the EU’s & Canada’s non shareholders
2) corporate Canada “prosecuting” EU offenders,
while continuing to render the non Canadian shareholders harmless & free of any associated costs*.
Consequently, there are many Canadians, Europeans, et al, who are continuing to insist that they need to review &, if possible, to improve upon the specific means that the EU is proposing to address these prerequisite issues, so that they might be further “guided” in their approval of your proposal & their subsequent approval of corporate Canada’s proposals regarding this proposed CETAgreement in order that all Canadians can avoid being informed again & after the fact :
“Well, you should have known. (President George H. Bush on NAFTA dispute â€œresolutionsâ€)
“We (the Canadians) did our best in (under) regretful (onerous) circumstances”. (paraphrased; PM Stephen Harper on the U.S not honoring the decisions of NAFTA dispute tribunals)
For the other information that may lead you, corporate Europe Union & their shareholders and the EU’s non shareholders, et al, to a greater certainty regarding what corporate Canada may be sharing with you regarding the accessing of the aforementioned, Canadian natural resources, I can be contacted at, &/or, by way of:
David E.H. Smith, 2173 Bradford Ave., Sidney, British Columbia, CANADA. V8L 2C8.,
You & the other CETA’s potential participants can access more of the relevant articles that I have researched & posted on Facebook (& several online newspapers, et al) at:
David Smith, Sidney, British Columbia.
And, as an impetus for Prime Minister Harper & the liaison between corporate Canada’s, et al, lobbyists & the Canadian political parties,
Mr. DAN HILTON,
to acknowledge their receipt of their “NOTIFICATIONS of Preexisting CHALLENGE to the Canada – EU Comprehensive Economic & Trade Agreement”, I’ll informed them, et al, of the receipt of your acknowledgment.
I’ll also pass along the Prime Minister’s acknowledgment of his receipt of his (the Canadian government’s, & thereby, corporate Canada’s) copy of “The NOTIFICATION of the Pre Existing CHALLENGE to the CETA” & the aforementioned information, etc., to you as soon as soon as I receive his acknowledgement.
Incidentally, I hope that you will understand that by the EU utilizing the enclosed, &/or, any other information that I have provided you with, it will not give the EU an unfair advantage over the Canadians, & thus, it will not give the Canadians, or, any third parties, a basis for making other “CHALLENGES” to the CETA.
On the contrary, one of the purposes of â€œThe Pre existing CHALLENGE” is to eliminate the basis for corporate Canada, et al, utilizing the aforementioned information as a basis of challenging the EU at a later date. However, by acknowledging the “Pre existing CHALLENGE”, it does not prohibit some non shareholders from utilizing corporate Canada’s funds to successfully challenge, both; corporates Canada & European Union & then, being compensated by corporates Canada & Europe Union at a later date.
Therefore, as a means of exculpating corporate EU from the aforementioned costs, the representatives of European Union, its potential shareholders & non shareholders, you, et al, might consider “Renditioning” (ie. by a third party) the relevant information that the non shareholders (ie. the most vulnerable Native & non Native Canadians, et al)
are continuing to deprived of (for instance; the information regarding The Compensation embodied in The WAD Accord) & thus, prevent the further spread of the economic disadvantages (such as; municipal & national bankruptcies & the aforementioned unconscionable high rates of poverty, unemployment, despair, suicides, disenchantment, etc. that are found in many communities across Canada)
the continuation of the global funneling of the instruments of commerce, ie. monetary value, into the reserves of fewer & fewer people in the “growing global economyâ€.
Furthermore, many citizens of the European Union, et al, are continuing to ask; why should the citizens of the EU give the less than scrupulous global corporate “citizens” who are the primary beneficiaries of the CETA another potential means of increasing their abuses & â€œunethicalâ€ profits by way of enhancing their ability to increase their deprivation of information via the CETA’s secret tribunals that employ mechanisms & procedures that are “un improvable” by the non shareholders, et al, in their determination of disputes & the awarding of financial penalties that are to paid for by the taxes of the non shareholders & the further reductions of services, particularly in the areas of health & education services? Why do corporates Canada & EU think that the harmless, taxpaying, non shareholders are willing to let them (corporates Canada & EU) use their taxes to increase the value of the shareholders’ CETA dividends, et al? Who do you think the 95% – 99% of the EU’s citizens, ie. the non shareholders, want to pay for the CETA’s penalties; the CETA’s cash beneficiaries, or, the non shareholders? And, therefore, what are the various different ways that:
1) the Canadian beneficiaries of the CETA can arrange for the Canada’s taxpaying, non shareholders to pay dividend enhancing “penalties” to corporate EU & its shareholders
2) the EU beneficiaries of the CETA can arrange for the EU’s taxpaying non shareholders to pay dividend enhancing “penalties” to corporate Canada & its shareholders?
Do the potential participants understand how lucrative this CETA conflict of interest is whereby the exclusive beneficiaries control:
a) the deprivation of the relevant information
b) the self-regulating, self- policing & self-adjudicating of their policies
c) determination of the amounts of their financial damages, punitive penalties & awards by way of their secret tribunals that may have different versions of “ethical”, &/or, “humane” considerations, as opposed to, “legal” considerations, than the 95% – 99% of the EU’s penalty paying, non shareholders, et al?
How much do you & the non shareholder citizens of the EU want the opportunity to consider the reasonableness of the ratio between:
a) the cash, front money
b) the future money that will be paid to the non shareholders by way of cash dividends
that they are being offered in order to consider approving, &/or, improving the CETA? At the least, is it not just prudent that the non shareholders be given the means to:
1) further investigate the enclosed issues, questions, etc.
2) discuss & consider the information & alternatives in forums that are free of the fear of retribution
before agreeing to the proposed CETA?
Therefore, as the CETA presently stands, with many of the potential participants:
1) continuing to be:
a) deprived of the aforementioned information
b) deprived of the answers to their questions
2) just beginning to learn that the non shareholders will be â€œforcedâ€ to pay the CETA’s financial penalties & bear “most” of the risks,
how much room do you & the citizens of EU, et al, think that there is for deniable abuses of the CETA “system”?
And, finally, regarding:
A) your due diligence research of the “renditioning” of The W.A.D. Accord information, et al,
B) your concerns about the consequences of misconstruing the intent of circumventing, &/or, superseding the basis for â€œThe Pre existing CHALLENGEâ€ (The Compensation & non shareholders’ uninformed burden as a consequence of the CETA, et al),
I suggest that you, the members of the EU & your citizens discuss the various ways that it can accomplished the aforementioned “greater certainty” with the following individuals & groups:
1) Mr. Geng Huichang, Minister of State Security (MSS) for the People’s Republic of China in Beijing via; Ambassador Kong Quan, 11, avenue George V – 75008 Paris, France
2) Mr. Al Monaco, President, Enbridge Co., 3000 Fifth Avenue Place, 425 – 1st Street S.W., Calgary, Alberta, Canada. T2P 3L8
3) Secretary-General of Iran’s High Council for Human Rights, Mr. Mohammad Javad Larijani,
Tehran, Iran via; Iran’s Ambassador to the U.N., Mr. Mohammad Khazaee,
Ambassador Ali Ahani, Iranian Embassy, 4, ave. d’Iena, 75016 Paris, France,
4) the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Navanethem Pillay,
Palais Wilson, 52 rue des PÃ¢quis, CH-1201 Geneva, Switzerland
5) Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (Member; Mr. Gervais Nzoa), United Nations, Room S-2954, New York, NY, 10017
6) President Peter Tomka, International Court of Justice, Peace Palace, Carnegieplein 2, 2517 The Hague, The Netherlands.
You, et al, might also consider contacting the aforementioned individuals & groups in order to see what are some of the solutions that may be in the process of being adopted by some of the other participants that helps the executives of the Canadian parties to avoid the appearance of breaking some of its arrangements (&/or, “covenants”) with some Canadian lobbyists, et al, in a politically deniable manner and thus, provide a greater “guarantee” of the certainty of the success of the CETA (eg.. using what has been learned from the experiences with the un ratified Canada – China Investment Treaty) for, not only the share holders, but, the non shareholders, as well. The aforementioned individuals & groups can also share with you their improvements to The W.A.D. Accord, & thereby, help you to exculpate most of the citizens of the EU from having to pay a disproportionate amount of the aforementioned Compensation
help you to minimize, &/or, eliminate a large portion of the basis for “The Pre Existing CHALLENGES” to the CETA & its potential penalties & punitive awards for damages, etc.
It may be an encouraging sign that many Europeans, et al, agree that by just “legalizing” the proposed procedures & practices by way of the CETAgreement, &/or, attempting to use the CETA to circumvent these contentious ethical issues, it can not release the direct beneficiaries of The CETAgreement from the aforementioned compensations, etc.
And, while the above information provides a much greater certainty for the EU shareholders, the aforementioned, simple improvement to the CETA, also provides the non shareholders with the information for the basis for much more informed opinions as to whether they might consider working for (with) any of the organizations, &/or, companies that have suggested that they have an interest in developing the aforementioned Canadian natural resources & the subsequent more equitable proportion of the aforementioned co manufactured of products.
By way of closing, there is another important question that I’ll leave you, et al, with;
would your potential EU shareholders in the projects that may derived from the CETAgreement consider paying the direct cash dividends in The W.A.D. Accord to both; the most vulnerable Native & non Native, non shareholders, who are being deprived of the aforementioned WAD Accord information & thus, are being deprived of the opportunity to provide their humble consideration of The Compensation that is embodied in The Accord,
in exchange for
more favorable terms for your shareholders in other areas of the CETAgreement by way of the aforementioned Canadian, et al, lobbyists’ clients, such as corporate Canada, the Assembly of First Nations, et al?
Or, another way of asking the question is;
under what circumstances would the potential EU shareholders, et al, in the aforementioned CETAgreement projects consider:
1) making the aforementioned “renditioning” of The W.A.D. Accord information to:
a) the aforementioned “most vulnerable ” Canadians, both; Native & non Native
b) the most vulnerable citizens of the European Union, ie. The EU’s non shareholders,
2) the exclusive use of a corporate Canada’s funding pool to pay the costs of, among other things, “The CETA CHALLENGES” that arise from the aforementioned, privileged deprivation of the relevant information, both; the ‘Pre Existing Challenges’ & the ‘After the Ratification Challenges’
as a means of creating a much greater certainty for the value of the shares of your potential EU shareholders & the corporate European Union?
As we know that there is much more to be accomplished in order to “guarantee” the aforementioned “greater certainty”, I look forward to more questions & the sharing of information regarding the enclosed & other, from the members of the EU Commission, EU Council, EU Parliament, corporate EU & its shareholders, its potential shareholders and non shareholders, et al.
David E.H. Smith
– “Qui tam…”
*Have the non shareholders of the EU & Canada had the opportunity to consider & then, perhaps, approve of their paying for the following other related CETA costs that corporate Canada & its potential shareholders may feel entitled to be covered by using the tax dollars of the non shareholders;
1) financing of the projects,
8) equal lobbying & advocacy to “disadvantaged” groups & individuals that may be harmed by “the development”,
9) the costs of designing, operating & obtaining the public approval of the dispute mechanisms & non public tribunals that may be associated with “the developments”, et al,
9) environmental protection,
10) “catch all” indemnities,
11) cost for over run by private insurance,
12) target tax reduction schedules & service increases schedules (particularly in the areas of:
a) the reductions to health care service waiting time,
b) expanded educational funding, etc.) to non shareholders as a consequence of their approval of “the development” complete with an approved Compensation fund for missing the aforementioned targets, etc.
c) et al,
13) the increase in the proposed proportions of the co manufacturing that will be developed in Canada, as opposed to being manufactured in Europe, &/or, elsewhere
14) et al.